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COMMENT
THE ATTORNEY AS PLAINTIFF AND QUASI-PLAINTIFF
IN CLASS AND DERIVATIVE ACTIONS:
ETHICAL AND PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
The plaintiff in both a class and derivative action is in the posi-
tion of litigating the rights of others. In a class action, a person who
has been injured sues for redress of that injury as an individual and
also as a representative of all others similarly situated.' In a derivative
action, the plaintiff is a stockholder who is suing on behalf of other
stockholders to redress an injury to the corporation.' Thus, in a class
action, the rights of all members of a class are on trial, while in a de-
rivative action, the rights of the corporation are in issue. Since these
nonparticipants may be bound by the outcome, it is essential that their
interests be properly adjudicated.' This proper adjudication only oc-
curs when the plaintiff both secures capable legal counsel and is able
to litigate the claim free of interests that may conflict with those of the
nonparticipants.' To this end, Federal Rule 23(a)(4) requires as a pre-
requisite to the institution of a class action that the representative
"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. "5 Similarly,
Federal Rule 23.1 requires the plaintiff in a derivative action to "fairly
and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or mem-
' Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
One or more mem bers of a class may sue or be sued as representative par-
ties on behalf of all only if (I) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable, (2) there arc questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will
Fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
Era. R. Ctv. P. 23(a).
2
 Eta R. Co/, 1'. 23.1 provides:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation Or association having failed to enforce a right which may
properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be verified and shall allege
(1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time the transac-
tion of' which he complaints or that his share or membership thereafter' de-
volved on him by operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collu-
sive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of' the United States which it
would not otherwise have. The complaint shall also allege with particular-
ity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires
from the directors or cmnparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members, and the reasons for his failure to obtain the ac-
tion or kir not making the The derivative action may not be main-
mined if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and adequately repre-
sent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in en-
forcing the right of' the corporation or association. The action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of
the proposed dismissal or compromise shall he given to shareholders in'
members in such manner as the court directs.
3
 Sec text at notes 24, 107 irtfuri.
4
 See note 34 and accompanying text
3
 Ern. R, Clv, P. 23(a)(4). Federal Rule 23(a) is quoted at note i supra.
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bers similarly situated in enforcing the rights of the corporation."
Concern over the adequacy of representation in a class or de-
rivative action is especially manifested where an attorney seeks to
serve the dual role of counsel and complaining party.' It also arises
where the counsel has a strong affiliation with the complaining party
such that the counsel becomes, in effect, a quasi-plaintiff.° In these
situations, the potential for a conflict of interests can become acute
due to the competing financial pressures, which stein primarily from
the discrepancy between the legal fees received by counsel and the re-
covery which the action may or may not generate.° An additional
source of concern in such actions is that the dual roles will lead to an
"appearance of impropriety" in violation of the American Bar Associ-
ation Code of Professional Responsibility.'° In class as in derivative ac-
tions, then, concerns over the adequacy of representation could well
prove to be a pitfall for the unwary attorney."
This comment will show that in analyzing Federal Rule 23(a)(4)
courts have looked upon the attorney's role as class representative
with general disfavor because of real or potential conflicts of financial
interests that would deprive the class of receiving adequate
representation." It will also be shown that in class actions, the quasi-
plaintiff situations have presented potential conflicts of interest be-
cause of the possibility of a sharing in the legal fees by the class
representative." There is also an ethical concern that a close relation-
ship between counsel and representative presents an "appearance of
impropriety. " 14 This comment will conclude that the protection of the
class action system dictates the discouragement of the counsel serving
as either the representative or quasi-plaintiff." The corresponding
roles of counsel and representative will also be discussed as they relate
to derivative actions under Federal Rule 23.1. 16 Since the problems of
conflict of interest and the "appearance of impropriety" are present in
derivative suits, several courts and commentators have suggested ap-
plying the same criteria utilized in certifying class actions under Fed-
eral Rule 23(a)(4) in ruling on the adequacy of representation in a de-
rivative action under Federal Rule 23.1) 7 This article will suggest that
" Fro. R. Civ. P. 23.1. Federal Rule 23.1 is quoted at note 2 supra.
7 See text at notes 43-60 infra.
"See notes 61-71 and accompanying text nyira.
See text at notes 47-50 infra.
"' See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No, 9. See text at notes 72.99 infra.
" The lack of specific guidelines as to when these ethical considerations will pre-
clude adequate representation when the attorney serves as representative plaintiff or
has a professional or family relationship with the representative, could result in a denial
of class action status when the attorney may feel all the requirements of adequacy have
been satisfied.
12 See text at notes 47-60 infra. .
See text at notes 70.71 infra.
' 4 See text at notes 72-99 infra.
14 See text at notes 98-99 infra.
16 See text at notes 101-130 infra.
17 See text at note 113 infra.
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there are legitimate distinctions in an analysis of adequacy of rep-
resentation under Rules 23 and 23.1 which courts should recognize in
refraining from mechanically adopting some of the 23(a)(4) criteria
when considering certain derivative actions.'" The discussion will con-
clude that while the concerns in the class action of the attorney qua
representative are sufficient to impose the same criteria in derivative
actions, the distinctions between the actions may be sufficient to dic-
tate a different standard for the quasi-plaintiff situation.
I. CLASS ACTIONS
The historical impetus for the development of class actions
was the need to alleviate the burden on the courts of unnecessary
litigation in cases where a claim was common to a number of
persons.'" One factor influencing the general acceptance of class ac-
tions has been recognition of the fact that the collective or accumula-
tive technique of this device makes possible an effective assertion of
many claims which otherwise would not be enforced for economic or
practical reasons. 2° Another measure of acceptability of this device has
been the effectiveness of the procedural safeguards built into the class
certification process. These safeguards are designed to screen out un-
warranted litigation and provide protection to those who may be
bound by it. The method for achieving this is embodied in Rule 23(a).
A. The Need for Adequate Representation
In certifying a class action, the court must first determine if all
of the prerequisites to a class action under Rule 23(a) have been met.
The class action plaintiff must show: 1) that the class be so numerous
that joinder would be impracticable; 2) that the class possess certain
questions of law or fact that are common to all members; 3) that the
class also hold claims or defenses that are similar to those of indi-
vidual parties and 4) that the class will receive adequate
representation." The first three requirements of Rule 23(a) are all
" See text at notes 124-130 infra.
" Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1973). For a de-
scription of the historical development of class actions see SB J. Muukt:. FEDERAL.
PRACTICE 1 23.02 (1976) [hereinafter cited as J. MooaiI.
2" Greenfield v. Villager Indus.. Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973). Some
representative examples of the types of class actions are: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Antitrust, Sherman Act); Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d
1355 (7th Cir. 1972) (First Amendment action brought by students suspended under an
allegedly invalid regulation governing distribution of printed matter on school pre-
mises); Mead v. Parker, 464 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir. 1972) (petition for a writ of habeas
corpus brought as a class action to redress conditions or confinement); Schneider v.
Electric Auto-Lite Co., 456 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1972) (class actions brought by employees
under the Labor-Management Relations Act); Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534
F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Kramer, 97 S. 0. 90
(1976) (alleged Securities Act violation); BoggS v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 114
(5th Cir. 1975) (Truth in Lending Act).
FED. R. CLV. P. 23(a) is quoted at note 1 supra.
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aimed at fulfilling the basic purpose of class actions—the avoidance of
duplicitous litigation by grouping claims." However, the requirement
of adequate representation goes to a different issue—protection of
parties who are not actively involved with the litigation of the class
action." This concern for members of a certified class who have not
actually participated in the conduct of the litigation results from the
binding nature which courts accord to final judgments entered in cer-
tified class actions. 24 The justification for this use of res judicata is
grounded in public policy: efficient court administration is thought
simply to outweigh the potential prejudice to persons who are not
parties but who may nevertheless become legally bound by the out-
come of a class action. 25 Still, this res judicata effect will only apply if
the procedural safeguards of Rule 23 are followed so as to provide
due process to those who are not in fact parties to a class'action suit."
22 Greenfield v. Villager Indus. Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973).
23 see note 24 itafra.
24 In Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) the Supreme Court stated:
It is familiar doctrine of the federal courts that members of a class not
present as parties to the litigation may be bound by the judgment where
they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present, or
where they actually participate in the conduct of the litigation in which
members of the class are present as parties, or where the interest of
the members of the class, some of whom are present as parties, is joint, or
where for any other mason the relationship between the parties present
and those who are absent is such as legally to entitle the former to stand in
judgment for the latter.
In all such cases, so far as it can be said that the members of the class
who are present are, by generally recognized rules of law, entitled to stand
in judgment for those who are not, we may assume for present purposes
that such procedure affords a protection to the parties who are rep-
resented, though absent, which would satisfy the requirements of due pro-
cess and full faith and credit
Id.
25 Greenfield v. Villager Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 824, 831 (3d Cir. 1973), See (au)
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
26 Rule 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual
members of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole: or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only indi-
vidual members, and that a class action is superior to other available
470
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The fundamental importance, then, of Rule 23(a)(4)'s require-
ment of adequate respresentation is not to be underestimated. This
prerequisite to class certification lies at the very heart of the pro-
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The
matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of
the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con-
troversy' already commenced by or against member's of the class; (C) the
desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the
management of a class action.
FED. R. Qv. P. 23(b)
Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(I) As soon as practicable alter the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is
to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional,
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) in any class action maintained tinder subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member
diat*(A) the court will exclude hint from the class if he so requests by a
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does
IRA request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
cou nsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b)(I) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable Int ihe class, shall in-
clude and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class.
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b)(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was di-
rected, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to he members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be di-
vided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provi-
sions of this rule shall then he construed and applied accordingly.
Fsn. R. CR', I', 23(c).
Courts consider the clue process right of notice under Rule 23(c)(2) to be ex-
tremely important. This was illustrated in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S, 15(1
(1974), in which the Court considered the notice requirements of Rule 23(0(2) applica-
ble to class actions brought under Rule 23(11)(3). The Supreme Court decided that the
express language of Rule 23(c)(2) leaves no doubt that individual notice must be sent to
all members of' the class identified through a reasonable effort. Id. at 173. There was
nothing to indicate in the case that individual notice could not be mailed to each of two
and a quarter million class members whose names and addresses were easily ascertaina-
ble. Moreover, for these people, individual notice was clearly the "best notice practica-
ble" within Ride 23(c)(2). The fact that costs would be prohibitive to the petitioner or
that individual notice might be unnecessary because no prospective member had a large
enough stake to justify separate litigation were not lbund SU flicent to dispense with
notice requirements, Ire. at 175-77. See Comment, The Importance of Being Adequate: Due
Process Requirements in Clam Actions Under Federal Rule 23, 123 U. PA. L. kxv. 1217 (1975)
where the author discusses the inter-relatiOnship between notice and adequate rep-
resentation; A ovIscritv Cottitorrnit:. (IN RULES, PROPOSED RULES of CIVIL PROCEDURE. 39
F.R.D. 69, 104.05 (1966).
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cedural safeguards protecting those parties not actively involved in a
class action, and as such, is one of the underpinnings upon which
public acceptance of the class action device rests. 27 The importance of
adequate representation as a means of protecting those parties not ac-
tively involved in a class action is further demonstrated by the histori-
cal development of Rule 23(a)(4). Prior to the 1966 amendments, 28
the original version of Rule 23 25 required the presence of a class rep-
resentative who would "fairly insure the adequate representation of
all."30
 Since under the original Rule only those parties directly before
the court in a "spurious" 3 ' class action were bound by the judgment,
there was no need to question the adequacy of representation, and
therefore some courts did not actively enforce this requirement.32
With the 1966 amendments, however, the "spurious" class was dis-
carded and the res judicata effects were extended to all class members
regardless of whether or not they were directly before the court. As a
result "a court must now carefully scrutinize the adequacy of rep-
resentation in all class actions." 33
B, Standard of Adequacy
During the decade since the 1966 amendments, courts interpret-
ing Rule 23(a)(4) have focused on two factors in determining the ade-
quacy of the class representation. First, the representative party must
forcefully protect the interests of the class by ensuring the proper
conduct of the litigation and by procuring a class attorney who is qual-
ified, experienced and generally able to conduct the litigation. Second,
the representative party must have interests which are compatible
with, and not antagonistic to, those whom he would represent. 34
27 See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
It is within the discretion of the court to determine whether there has been com-
pliance with the requirements of Rule 23(a), and plaintiffs, as parties seeking class cer-
tification, bear the burden of demonstrating that each requirement has been met. See
Demarco v. Edens, 390 F.2c1 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968).
" 383 U.S. 1047 (1966).
" Rule OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23, 308 U.S. 689 (1939).
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(a), 308 U.S. 689 (1939).
" "Spurious" class actions were those brought under old Rule 23(a)(3). 308 U.S.
689 (1939). See 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1752 at
511-37 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRitat'r & MILLER]
" Oppenheimer v. Young & Co., 144 F.2d 387, 390 (2d Cir. 1944). See 7
W FUGHT Pe M ii.I.ER,supra note 31, § 1765 at 615-17.
" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968).
34 Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202, 206-07 (D.D.C. 1069). See Dolgow v.
Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 493-94 (E.D. N.Y. 1968) (dicta), reversed and remanded, 438
F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); Mersay v. First Republican Corp. of America, 43 F.R.D. 465,
469 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See 7 WRicirr & MILLER. supra note 31 § 1761- §1769 at
584-657. Plaintiff has the burden of showing compliance with Rule 23(a)(4), Philadel-
phia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1968), yet
it is interesting to note the "interest" that defendants have shown in protecting the
rights of plaintiff class members, since most of the challenges to adequacy of represen-
tation come from defendants. The Court in In re Goldchip Funding Co., 61 F.R.D. 592,
594 (M.D. Pa. 1974) acknowledged that the defendants in objecting to the adequacy of
472
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In analyzing the representative's forcefulness or interest in the
class, the courts have been more concerned with the quality than the
quantity of representation. In Eisen v. Carlisle & jacquelin, 35 the court
stated "we believe that reliance on quantitative elements to determine
adequacy of representation ... is unwarranted. Language to the effect
that a small number of claimants cannot adequately represent an en-
tire class has frequently been cited ... but we fail to understand the
utility of this approach."" In focusing on the individual who is in-
stituting the action, courts have applied a standard that the "represen-
tatives must be of such a character as to assure the vigorous prosecu-
tion or defense of the action, so that the members' rights are certain
to be protected."37 Accordingly courts have considered a rep-
resentative's integrity and have looked at factors "such as the
representative's honesty; consciousness, and other affirmative personal
qualities" in making a determination under Rule 23(a)(4). 3 " However,
when the class representative also acts as class counsel, the courts have
become concerned with both qualitative and quantitative factors.
C. The Counsel as Class Representative
A crucial responsibility of the class representative is the engage-
ment of an attorney who will conduct the litigation." However, in
conducting a class action the attorney is more than a mere technician.
This point was stressed in Greenfield v. Villager Industries, Inc." In this
class action suit in which a settlement had been reached, the plaintiffs
through their counsel had expressed an intention to send individual
notices but instead had given publication in two newspapers. The
court felt this substitution was not the "best notice practicable" and
expressed strong dissatisfaction with the extremely superficial com-
pliance with class action principles. It felt that class counsel had
breached a Fiduciary duty to those not before the court by failing to
representation "are probably more interested in preventing class action status than they
are in assuring that the prospective class is properly represented."
" 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
" Id. at 563. See also Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714
(7th Cir. 1968). Professor (now Judge) Weinstein in Revision of Procedure: Some Problems
in Glass Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. Rev. 433, 460 (1960) says about adequacy:
A class action should not be denied merely because every member of the
class might nut be enthusiastic about enforcing his rights .... The court
need concern itself only with whether those members who are parties are
interested enough to be forceful advocates and with whether there is
reason to believe that a substantial portion of the class would agree with
their representatives were they given a choice.
" 7 WRIGHT & Mim•g,supra note 31, § 1766 at 633-34. See Hohmann v, Packard
Instrument Co., 399 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1968),
" Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Stipp. 1099, 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See, e.g., Tech-
nograph Printed Circuits, Ltd. v. Methode Elecs. Inc., 285 F. Supp. 714, 721 (N.D. III.
1968).
" See text at note 34 supra.
4 " 983 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1973).
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comply with the notice requirements of Rule 23. 4 ' In vacating an
order approving the settlement, the court stressed the importance of
counsel's role: "Experience teaches that it is counsel for the class rep-
resentative and not the named parties, who direct and manage these
actions. Every experienced federal judge knows that any statements to
the contrary is sheer sophistry . "4 2 As has been discussed," the re-
quirement of adequate representation can be breached if the rep-
resentative has interests which are either actually or potentially an-
tagonistic to those of the class itself. This antagonism inevitably arises
when the class representative also acts in the role of class counsel. In
such a situation the attorney as class representative must maintain in-
terests which are compatible with the class and see that the class in-
terests are enforced by procuring adequate legal services." The attor-
ney assuming the role of class counsel must act in a fiduciary capacity
to the class by following the safeguards of Rule 23." Additionally in
this situation the attorney assumes a third role, because the attorney
acting as an attorney must guarantee his livelihood by ensuring that
he will collect a fee for his services. This last consideration may create
a conflict of interest between the roles of representative and counsel
in at least three respects."
The first conflict is a direct result of the complex litigation of a
class action which can generate large attorney's fees.' Typically these
fees far outweigh any recovery a member of the class may receive. 48
This discrepancy has concerned courts faced with the attorney as class
representative," and some have used this as a basis to deny class cer-
" Id. at 832. Cf. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, Etc., 410 F. Supp. 680,
690 (U. Minn. 1975) (court and counsel have the duty to protect and guard the absent
members of the class). It may be asked how far this obligation extends. is the Greenfield
court implying that it would entertain a malpractice suit because the "reasonably pru-
dent" attorney would have served notice differently? From the strength of the court's
argument, this could he a logical extension.
" 483 F.2d at 832 n.9.
" See text at note 34 supra.
44 See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
" See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
"'It has already been shown that if the attorney were incompetent in the role of
class counsel the requirements of 23(a)(4) would not be met. See text at note 34 supra.
The question in issue concerns the attorney's satisfying the second factor in the role of
class representative, i.e. having interests compatible with, and not antagonistic to, those
whom he would represent.
" For example, the fees allowed in Alpine Pharmacy, Inc. v. Pfizer & Co., 481
F.2d 1045, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1973), which was a class action antitrust suit, were
$1,960,000 when the recovery was over $12.5 million. See also Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v.
Slattery, 102 F.2d 58, GI (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 648 (1939); Comment,
Computing Attorney's Fees in Class Actions: Recent Judicial Guidelines, 16 B.C. I I. & Cot. L.
RE:v. 630 (1975).
4g In Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 2'21 (N.D. Ill. 1972),
the 3,000 class members received an average recovery of approximately $2,000 while
the attorneys received a fee of over $1 million. Id. at 222-26.
49
 In Cotchett v. Avis Rentacar Sys. Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 554 (S.D,N.Y. 1972), the
court stated: "The difficulty I have with this situation lies in the fact that the possible
recovery of Mr. Cotcheu as a member of the class is Far exceeded by the financial in-
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tification. The rationale advanced is that where a "person is a member
of two groups with distinct and conflicting interests, and if the
economic interest in one of his roles significantly outweighs the
economic interest in the other, such a person cannot adequately rep-
resent the latter group."''"
Second, the potential for large fees has alerted courts to the
problem of solicitation." If an attorney initiates an action as both class
representative and class counsel, there arises a strong question of
whether the action is being brought to generate attorney's fees. This
counsel qua representative situation seems susceptible prima fade to
criticism as a questionable method of soliciting legal business. 52
 Since
solicitation does not "comport with the high quality of objectivity, duty
and integrity required of lawyers" the practice is discouraged by deny-
ing class certification to the counsel qua representative."
terest Mr. Cotcheo might have in the legal fees engendered by this lawsuit." See also
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 39! F.2d 555, 571 (2d Cir. 1968), where Chief Judge
Lombard observed that the "only persons to gain from a class suit are not potential
plaintiffs, but the attorneys who will represent them''; Illinois v. Harper & Row Pub-
lishers, Inc,, 55 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. 111. 1972) where the court relied on the words of
al old Italian proverb: "A lawsuit is a fruit tree planted in a lawyer's garden."
Seiden v. Nicholson, 69 F.R.D. 681, 687 (N.D. ill. 1976). Sly olio Conway v.
City of Kenosha, 409 F. Supp. 349, 349 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Sweet v. Bermingham, 65
F.R.1), 551, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dicta) "IW)liere a representative party also serves as
counsel, or co-counsel, for the purported class, a conflict of interest clearly arises.'';
Pont. v. Wyly, 61 F.R.D. 615, 623 (D. Del. 1973); Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D.
448 (D. Ariz. 1972).
•'r Blank v. Talley Indus., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 1, 7 (S.D.N.Y, 1975). Client solicita-
tion in a class action should result in no allowance of attorneys' fees.
" Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 450 (I). Adz. 1972).
"Id. See also Graybeal v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 59 F.R.D. 7, 14
(D.D.C. 1973).
For an argument that solicitation should he encouraged, see Schuor, Gloss Actions:
The Right to Solicit, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 215 (1976). The author suggests that be-
cause solicitation will provide an increased awareness of potential plaintiffs' rights,freer
access to information and price competition, it should be allowed and encouraged.
However, EC 2-3 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility provides in pad:
[The giving of advice to take legal action] is improper if motivated by a
desire to obtain personal benefit, secure personal publicity, or cause litiga-
tion to be brought merely to harass or injure another. Obviously, a lawyer
should not contact a non-client, directly or indirectly, for the purpose of
being retained to represent him for compensation.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL. En tics EC 2-3. Therefore, until this policy is changed it
will be assumed, arguendo, that solicitation is harmful to the profession and should be
discouraged.
For a suggestion that there are valid reasons for allowing the attorney to serve as
representative in highly specialized antitrust and securities cases see Halverson v. Con-
venient Food Mart, Inc., 458 F.2d 927. 931 11.5 (7th Cir. 1972); 7 WRIGHT it: MILLER,
supra note 31, Q 1766 at 635. The suggestion is that in these cases there may he a size-
able recovery to the class, and the high lees may serve as an added incentive, thereby
assuring that the interests of the class are adequately represented. This view overlooks
the fact that although such lees may serve as incentive to vigorous prosecution, they
may also serve as incentive to solicitation, which the legal community generally con-
demns. Moreover, there is still the concern of many courts in the discrepancy between
the amount received by the attorney as a member of the class and the amount received as
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A third potential role conflict for the plaintiff-attorney arises in
the area of settlement. In any class action there is always the tempta-
tion to settle the action on terms less favorable to the class if a large
fee can be part of the bargain. That temptation is increased where the
attorney is the representative and may "stand to gain little as class
representative, but may gain very much as attorney for the class." 54
However, since the court must approve a settlement, 55 at least one
court has decided this approval is a sufficient deterrent to prevent the
attorney from settling to collect his fees. In Lamb v. United Security Life
Co.," an attorney sought to serve as both counsel and representative
in a class action alleging securities violations. The court did not accept
the proposition that the attorney was seeking to obtain a greater
proportion of the recovery than other class members and thus was an
unfit representative." The court reasoned that any fees earned as an
attorney would be for services rendered and it saw no conflict when
the same individual sought a sum in redress as a representative. The
"court was confident that since attorneys' fees would come under court
scrutiny, any problem generated by a conflict of interest could be re-
solved at a later time."
Although this judicial confidence may be reassuring, Lamb seems
incorrectly decided for two reasons. First, as has been discussed, the
dual roles of counsel and representative have inherent conflicts of
interests." Although the settlement may require court supervision
and approval, a court usually cannot adequately supervise the attor-
ney to ensure that he is also providing appropriate representation to
the class as its representative. With the complexities inherent in a class
action, a court simply does not have the capabilities to perform this
added task, especially where the economic interests of counsel may
outweigh his economic interest in providing adequate
representation. 6 ° The second reason relates to the basic procedure as-
counsel. See text at notes 47-53 supra. A case which supports the theory that money is
the root of this evil is Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 293 (S.D. N.Y. 1976) in which
the plaintiff representative had rendered legal services to the class and expected to con-
tinue to do so. The court granted class action status predicated upon satisfactory per-
sonal assurance from plaintiff that he would be bound by an order prohibiting him
from direct or indirect participation in any legal fees. Id.
5*
	 v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n. 59 F.R.D. 7, 13-14 (D.D.C. 1973)
(certification denied to counsel qua representative).
55 FED. R. Ci v. P. 23 (e) states that "[al class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court ...."
" 59 F.R.D. 25 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
" Id. at 31.
" Id. See also Umbriac v. American Snacks, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 265, 275 (E•D. Pa.
1975).
55
 See text at notes 47-54 supra.
61' As stated in the context of a derivative action by the court in G.A. Enterprises,
Inc. v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 517 F.2d 24 ( Ist Cir. 1975): "It is true that
the suit could not be settled without court approval. However, a court's ability to over-
see complex litigation and understand all its nuances is limited by its many other duties.
In an adversary system a court must rely largely on the parties." Id. at 27.
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suring adequate representation. Rule 23(a)(4) requires that adequate
representation be demonstrated before the action is certified, not
while the suit is being settled and attorneys' fees are awarded. If a
court waits until that time, the purpose of Rule 23(a)(4) may have
been defeated because the class may have already suffered inadequate
representation. Thus a court should be careful from the outset of
litigation to deter attorneys from bringing suits as class representatives
and should not rely on its ability to approve settlements as a means of
ensuring adequate representation.
D. The Relationship Between the Representative and Quasi -Plaintiff
With the exception of the Lamb decision, courts generally have
summarily rejected the proposition that the class counsel may also
serve as class representative." Courts have generally decided that in
such a situation the interests of the representative and the interests of
the class as a whole are conflicting and not compatible, based upon
the discrepancy between the potentially large fees awarded to the
counsel and the amount awarded to the individual class members.
However, the basis for this role conflict is not as apparent when the
class representative has an affiliation with the counsel, for example,
when the representative is counsel's relative, close friend, or law part-
ner. In this situation while the counsel and representative are not the
same person, the relationship may be such that the counsel takes the
position of quasi-plaintiff. Of course, unlike the representative qua
counsel situations, the class representative will not be paid attorney's
fees if the action is successful. As a result there is not direct economic
antagonism between the counsel and the representative. However, as
will be discussed, the relationship between representative and counsel
may be disfavored because of the underlying association between the
parties.
On its face,. Rule 23(a)(4) imposes its adequacy requirement
upon the party bringing the class action. However, if as the court
suggested in Greenfield "it is counsel for the class representative, and
not the named parties, who direct [class actions],"" there is a strong
implication that the representative's role is minimal; consequently, the
focus for adequacy of representation should be on the counsel. The
Greenfield statement also suggests counsel in the fiduciary role really
performs the representative's functions; therefore, if this analysis is
true and the conflicts of interest discussed in the counsel qua rep-
resentative situation are ignored, then a competent class attorney who
can satisfy the procedural requirements of Rule 23 really does ensure
that the class is receiving adequate representation. Theoretically then,
it should not matter who plays the representative's role, since counsel
is the driving force. Furthermore, this line of analysis carried to its
" 1 See text at notes 50-54 supra.
"483 F.2d at 832 n.9.
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logical conclusion would necessarily maintain that if the counsel is
competent, the representative could he the attorney's spouse, sibling,
law partner or even the attorney himself without creating a doubt as
to the adequacy of representation. Not all courts have shared the
Greenfield court's perception of the representative's role as being one
of a minimal nature. For example, a case which suggests the appro-
priateness of placing greater emphasis on the representative is In re
Goldchip Funding Co. 63 In this class action the class representatives in-
cluded a housewife and a student, neither of whom had much busi-
ness experience or knowledge of the facts, and who consequently
were completely relying on their attorneys to direct the litigation. The
court denied class certification indicating that lamn attorney who
prosecutes a class action with unfettered discretion becomes, in fact,
the representative of the class. This is an unacceptable situation be-
cause of the possible conflicts of interest involved." 64
On its surface, Goldchip differs from many of the other cases in-
volving the attorney as a quasi-plaintiff since it is concerned more
with the degree of the attorney's authority than with the form of the
counsel and representative's relationship. The decision itself is based
on the court's view that the plaintiffs did not have a keen interest in
the progress of the litigation. The court would have rejected a counsel
qua representative situation, and equated the attorney with the plain-
tiff in these circumstances. It undertook an investigation into the
capabilities of the named parties. By contrast, the Greenfield court
would have assumed that the counsel was the driving force, that the
representative's role was minimal, and that any thoughts to the con-
trary were "sheer sophistry." The Goldchip court rejected this ap-
proach, finding that Rule 23 requires more than a mere puppet
representation. 85
 The decision in Goldchip thus supports the idea that
since potential conflicts exist between the representative's role and the
counsel's role when these roles are effectively assumed by the same
person, the class is denied adequate representation. The requirement
of the representative's role under Rule 23(a)(4) is that he "fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class." 66 However, the "[p]roper
representative can offer more to the prosecution of a class action than
mere fulfillment of the procedural requirements of Rule 23." 67 The
Goldchip court recognized this in suggesting that the representative
can "for example, offer his personal knowlege of the factual circum-
stances, and aid in rendering decisions on practical and non-legal
problems which arise during the course of litigation." 68 The
representative's duties also can include monitoring the class counsel or
6' 61 F.R.D. 592 (M.D. Pa. 1974).
"Id. at 595. The court cited Graybeal v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n; 59
F.R.D. 7 (D.D.C. 1975). See note 54 supra.
es
	
F.R.D. at 594.
a FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). Rule 23(a)(4) is quoted at note I .supra.
67 Goldrhip, 61 F.R.D. at 594.
" Id. at 594-95.
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agreeing to a settlement. 69 These functions require that the represen-
tative have enough independence to exercise unconstrained judgment.
This requirement of independence thus disposes of the ap-
proach in Greenfield which places emphasis on the counsel rather than
representative in a class action. The required independence vanishes
in the representative qua counsel cases because the two roles engen-
der conflicting financial interests. It is this conflict which adds an
unanswerable dimension to the Greenfield emphasis on the counsel.
The requirement for independence and the concern over a financial
conflict of interest also offer a guide to the quasi-plaintiff cases.
Theoretically, if the relationship between counsel and representative is
one in which the representative would share in attorneys' fees there
would be a conflict of interest sufficient to preclude adequate rep-
resentation. This conflict of' financial interests test has been applied to
deny certification when the class representative was the law partner"
or wife of the class counsel." In these situations where the attorney
and representative, because of a family or professional relationship
may share in the attorneys' fees, the courts have found a sufficient fi-
nancial relationship to create a conflict of interest.
However, the use of Rule 23(a)(4) when the attorney acts as a
quasi-plaintiff presents a glaring problem: at what point in the rela-
tionship between counsel and plaintiff does the relationship become
so tenuous as to prevent a claim of conflict of interest. For example
may a law partner of class counsel act as class representative with a
written agreement that the law partner will not share in the counsel's
attorneys' fees? May the class representative be a brother, sister or
close friend of the class counsel? Would such a situation create a suf-
ficient financial relationship to warrant a court denying a class action?
E. The "Appearance of Impropriety" Test
A potentially viable solution to resolving these quasi-plaintiff
problems is found in Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp." where the
court was faced with the appearance of a conflict of interest and
utilized ethical considerations to remove the class counsel." The case
"See Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 534 F.2d 1085, 1093-94 (3d Cir.)
(Rosenn. J., concurring), cert. denied sub nom., Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Kramer, 97 S.
Ct, 90 (1976).
7" Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir, 1976).
71 Stull v. Pool, 63 F.R.D. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
72 64 F.R.D. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1974), motion denied, 67 F.R.D. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
rezid, 534 F.2d 1085 (3d Cir.), cert, denied sub nom., Arthur Anderson & Co. v. Kramer,
97 S. Ct. 90 (1976). See also, 365 F. Supp, 780 (F.D. Pa. 1973); 352 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
73 There has been much litigation on attorney conduct in class actions outside the
attorney's relationship to class counsel. Most of these cases involve actions taken by the
attorney that may be unethical, such as improper discovery procedures. See e.g., W.T.
Grant Co. v, Haines, 531 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1976); Halverson v. Convenient Food Mart,
Inc., 458 F.2d 927 (7th Cir. 1972); Comment, Ethical Obligations of the Attorney Under
Rule 23—Abuses and Reforms, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 224 (1974).
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arose out of a class action in which two law partners, one of whom
sought to serve as representative, and whose firm acted as class coun-
sel, filed an action claiming damages in the fraudulent sale of
securities. 74 The defendants maintained that the requirements of Rule
23(a)(4) were - not met, alleging that the attorneys had brought the ac-
tion primarily to generate fees. 75 The district court granted class ac-
tion certification and denied a motion to disqualify plaintiffs' counsel.
The court declared that whatever the plaintiffs' motives were, based
on its observation of the plaintiffs so far in the case, the class would
be adequately represented." The defendants later moved to have the
class counsel removed on the grounds that the relationship between
the class representative and class counsel constituted a conflict of in-
terest in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility." This
motion was also denied by the district court." On appeal the Third
Circuit reversed the denial of the disqualification motion, 79 basing its
decision on Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, enti-
tled, "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even The Appearance of Professional
Impropriety."89
During the course of the litigation the representatives had tried
to avoid any claim of professional impropriety by agreeing not to
share in any attorneys' fees which might come to the law firm because
of the action." In addition, the two law partners did not act directly
as class counsel but instead employed an associate in their firm to act
" 534 F.2d 1085, 1087 (3d Cir. 1976).
75 64 F.R.D. 558, 559 (F.D. Pa. 1974).
"Id. at 559. The court only considered the competency criteria for adequacy,
and -neglected to consider the requirement that there be no conflicting interests be-
tween the representative and the class.
" 534 F.2d 1085, 1087 (3d Cir. 1976) (the district court opinion is unpublished).
78 Id. at 1087. The defendants had also submitted a motion requesting that the
class action certification be revoked. 67 F.R.D. at 99. This motion was also denied by
the district court. Id. On an interlocutory appeal; the Third Circuit dismissed the ap-
peal holding that a "class certification decision, per se, is not an appealable final order
." 534 F.2d at 1087. However, the circuit court did find that the denial of the mo-
tion for disqualification of counsel was an order subject to immediate review. Id. at
1088. It found that a serious question of impropriety arises in the context of a motion
to disqualify counsel. Id. at 1088. The court invoked the collateral rule of Cohen v. Ben-
eficial Indus. Loan Corp. 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) which would put this question into
that small class of rights "separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require
that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." 534 F.2d
at 1088.
" 534 F.2d at 1093.
'4 ° ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 9. EC 9-2 provides in part:
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of a lawyer. On occasion, ethical conduct of a lawyer
may appear to laymen to be unethical.... When explicit ethical guidance
does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a man-
ner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the
legal system and the legal profession.
81 534 F.2d at 1089.
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as counsel. This procedure would seem to negate any contention that
the interests of the representatives were antagonistic with those of the
class, because the lawyers would not share in the recovery of attor-
neys' fees. Yet the Third Circuit rejected the maneuver on the
grounds that, despite the agreement not to accept attorneys' fees,
there was still an appearance of impropriety. The court noted that the
general public understood the basic function of a partnership such as
a law firm, especially as it relates to the sharing of profits." The
Court stated that lelsoteric internal protection in writing or under
oath, insulating the plaintiff-attorney partner from participating in a
fee, can hardly dissipate the lay notion that action by one partner is
action for the partnership."" In the court's view, this lay understand-
ing of partnerships, coupled with an attorney acting as counsel to a
class representative who is a member of the same law firm, is contrary
to the dicates of' EC 9-2, which had been incorporated into the local
rules of the district."' The court also acknowledged that "[I]mportant
as it was that people should get justice, it was even more important
that they should be made to feel they were getting it." 85 A majority of
the court believed that from this has emerged what may be described
as an axiomatic norm, that "the appearance of conduct associated with
institutions of the law be as important as the conduct itself." 88 Citing
case law precedent for disqualifying an attorney "for not only acting
improperly, but also for failing to avoid the appearance of
impropriety"" the court held that:
No member of the bar either maintaining an employment
relationship, including a partnership or professional corpo-
ration, or sharing office or suite space with an attorney
class representative during the preparation or pendency of
a Rule 23(b)(3) class action may serve as counsel to the class
if the action might result in the creation of a fund from
which an attorneys' fees award would be appropriate."
On its face the holding of the court appears to have a narrow
scope, relating only to the question of who may not serve as counsel
"2 1d. at 1092. The court also stated that:
[Me cannot agree that an appearance of improper conflict of interest in-
herent in one partner's dual role as class representative and as class coun-
sel vanishes when his partner is substituted as class counsel. To argue as
appellees do is to argue against reality, against the vagaries of human na-
ture, and against widely-held public impressions of the legal profession.
83 Id.
"A question arises as to the disposition of such cases in jurisdictions that may
not have incorporated the Canons or that may have a different view of ethical consid-
erations. See generally note 73 supra.
83 /d. at 1088.
"" Id.
" 2 Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1385-86 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 986 (1973).
" 534 F.2d at 1093.
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when a fund is created. This view is reinforced by the concurring
opinion of Judge Rosenn, who suggested that the majority would pre-
vent an attorney from acting as class counsel only when the action
creates a fund from which attorneys' fees are awarded and when the
class representative is the class counsel or an attorney professionally
associated with the attorney seeking to act as class counse1. 89 Judge
Rosenn did not see the majority's holding as barring an attorney from
acting as counsel to a class with claims similar or identical to claims in
which the attorney has a beneficial interest as long as the attorney was
not the representative." The distinction is that there is no appearance
of financial conflict of interest and no appearance of improper
solicitation—"that the attorney-plaintiff and class counsel collusively
[used] the class action mechanism to acquire clients." 91
The concurring opinion thus tries to restrict the "appearance of
impropriety" test to the narrow bounds of the facts presented in the
case, without the same enthusiasm for the expansive reading of
Canon 9 that was evidenced by the majority. 92
 Judge Rosenn seems to
be testing for a "hint" of impropriety based upon some factual basis
rather than the "appearance" of impropriety based upon the mere re-
lationship between counsel and representative that is sufficient for the
majority. By testing for this "hint" Judge Rosenn could require a
higher threshold of impropriety than the majority. Thus the opinions
could have different results in future quasi-plaintiff situations. Both
the concurring and majority opinions would probably prevent an at-
torney from acting as counsel when the class representative is the
counsel's spouse because the situation has a "hint" as well as "appear-
ance" of a financial conflict of interest. However, the two opinions
may have different results where, for example, the representative is a
cousin or close acquaintance of class counsel. If there is no factual
basis or a hint of a financial conflict of interest or improper solicita-
tion, under the analytic approach of the concurring opinion the action
would probably be permitted to proceed. If the relationship between
counsel and representative were close enough to reach a threshold
"appearance" of impropriety, then under the majority approach the
action would likely be prevented from continuing. Thus, by testing
for an "appearance" rather than a "hint" of impropriety the majority
opinion would allow fewer quasi-plaintiff actions to proceed than
would the concurring opinion.
KO Id.
5" 14, Judge Rosenn noted that if a client-stockholder sought advice on the
method of bringing a class action against a corporation for fraudulent dealings in
shares, there would be no objection if' the attorney (also a shareholder) served as class
counsel. Also, if the attorney's spouse or law firm in which the attorney is a partner
owned stock and sought advice, the attorney need not decline representation. Id.
91 Id.
" "If we are to provide force and vigor to Canon 9, a prophylactic rule prohibit-
ing appointment of a partner as counsel is mandated in such circumstances." 534 F.2d
at 1092.
482
ATTORNEY AS PLAINTIFF IN CLASS AND DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
In showing such enthusiasm for proper appearances of.justice
the Third Circuit may have impliedly incorporated Canon 9 into Rule
23(a)(4). This incorporation may be implied from the fact that Kramer
deals with the dismissal of counsel under Canon 9, while Rule 23(a)(4)
is concerned with the ability of the representative in conducting the
litigation. In Kramer the law partners had attempted to dispel' any
conflict between the roles of representative and counsel by agreeing
not to participate in the fee recovery. Accordingly, if the court were
faced with a request for class certification under these facts, it could
not find the clear antagonistic interests present in cases where attor-
neys act directly as class representatives. However, the Kramer court
decided after the district court had granted certification that such an
arrangement was unacceptable because of an "appearance of impro-
priety." Therefore, "this appearance of impropriety" is equally unac-
ceptable at the time the representative seeks certification. Thus, if the
Kramer court were faced with the same situation at the outset of the
litigation, it would probably be unable to certify the class. The basis
for this determination would be the requirement that a class represen-
tative under Rule 23(a)(4) must be a person of strong character and
affirmative personal qualities." Clearly the appearance of an impro-
priety in the representative's use of counsel casts doubt on the
representative's ability to provide adequate representation under
23(a)(4). On the basis of the "appearance of impropriety" the class ac-
tion would therefore be denied. Thus the "appearance of impropri-
ety" standard of EC-9 would be incorporated into the demands of
Rule 23(a)(4).
Applying ethical considerations in a Rule 23(a)(4) determination
may seem an unjustified expansion of the Rule, but it is not without
precedent. A straightforward solution of denying class certification
under Rule 23(a)(4) because of ethical concerns in the quasi-plaintiff
case was used in Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc.," in which the
plaintiff was a member of the firm acting as class counsel. The court
ruled that the plaintiff was an inadequate representative because a
burdensome ethical question would be raised if he had to be called as
a witness while his firm was employed in the matter. 15 Since the court
found that ethics would require his firm—familiar with the case from
the start—to withdraw if he were called as a witness, the class would
be disadvantaged if he were to serve as plaintiff."
" 3 See text at notes 37.38 supra.
14 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
" 5 Id. at 105.
" The court did not make reference to the Code of Professional Responsibility.
However, two provisions explicitly support the Courts decision. EC 5-9 states: "An ad-
vocate who becomes a witness is in the unseemly and ineffective position of arguing his
own credibility. The roles of an advocate and of a witness are inconsistent; the function
of an advocate is to advance or argue the cause of another, while that of a witness is to
state facts objectively." DR 5-101(11) states in general: "A lawyer shall not accept em-
ployinent in contemplated or pending litigation If lie knows or it is obvious that he or a
lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness . , .." It would appear that this Canon
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The incorporation of Canon 9 into Rule 23(a)(4) can be used in
any situation where the relationship between counsel and the class
representative creates the appearance of impropriety." Extending this
approach to a decision as to whether the class should be certifed in
quasi-plaintiff situations other than where the representative is the
counsel's law partner, the test of adequacy of representation should
minimize the "appearance of impropriety" between the counsel and
representative. Arguably this standard would deny certification where
the representative is the counsel's spouse, sibling or law partner since
the impropriety suggested in these situations is the common gain,
either familial or professional, to be derived from legal fees. This de-
nial might not extend to close friends or neighbors or others with
whom impropriety is not as apparent. However, the granting of class
action certification is discretionary and if, in the court's judgment, the
"appearance of impropriety" has passed beyond an acceptable
threshold, then even in the close friend or neighbor situation, the cer-
tification should be denied." This stringent "appearance of impropri-
could also he used by courts in the counsel qua representative cases. See also text at
notes 43-45 supra.
" This improper relationship refers to an appearance of impropriety in the
quasi-plaintiff situation, giving rise to inadequate representation under 23(a)(4) due to
the ethical concerns discussed. Ethical violations caused by other than this appearance,
such as attorney conduct that may cause disqualification of counsel are beyond the
scope of this discussion. The remedies appropriate in such situations will not be consid-
ered. For a discussion of alleged conflicts of interest arising from a present or former
representation of an interest adverse to that of a current client, see note, Disqualification
of Counsel for the Appearance of Professional Inpropriety, 25 CAM. U. L. REV. 343 (1976).
See note 73 supra.
" However, in some cases, the court may not be able to enforce Rule 23(a)(4) be-
cause the improper relationship may not surface until the class has been certified. At
this point the court may dismiss the action because the class is inadequately rep-
resented, disqualify the counsel, or allow the action to proceed and issue an appropriate
order under Rule 23(d), such as substitution of class representative. It should be em-
phasized that the court has a great deal of discretion under Rule 23(d) and (e), and de-
pending upon the circumstances of the case, it may fashion its remedy accordingly.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(d) provides that:
In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies, the court may make
appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of proceedings or prescrib-
ing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication in the presenta-
tion of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the
members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that
notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of
the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they con-
sider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims
or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing conditions
on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requiring that the
pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations as to representa-
tion of absent persons, and that the action proceed accordingly; (5) dealing
with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an
order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable
from time to time.
FED. R. Civ, P, 23(d).
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ety" standard would hopefully address two concerns which have also
arisen in the representative qua counsel cases. The first is the protec-
tion of the class action as a device for individual claimants to seek
redress free from champertous litigation that could serve to defeat the
basic purposes of this procedure. The class action is a device for effec-
tive assertion of claims otherwise unenforceable," not a means for
securing large legal fees. By restricting the certification of class actions
to those which appear to be brought for the purpose of asserting
these claims and not for the mere benefit of attorneys, the courts will
help provide protection to the class action system. The second con-
cern addressed by the "appearance of impropriety" approach is the
suspicion with which attorneys are viewed today. With recent revela-
tions of misdeeds by lawyers on a national level, attorneys face in-
creased public scrutiny. 13y refusing to allow an action to proceed if
any impropriety appears to exist, the use of ethical considerations in
Rule 23(a)(4) will help to preserve the integrity of the legal profession.
II. DERIVATIVE ACTIONS
As has been demonstrated in the previous discusSion, the pro-
cedural structure of a class action can raise several questions as to the
propriety and adequacy of representation if counsel also acts as class
representative or as quasi-plaintiff. In considering these questions in
the context of derivative actions, several courts and commentators'°°
have suggested that the principles that apply in class actions should
also be applied to derivative actions. They argue that the same con-
flicts of interests that may preclude adequate representation in class
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that: "A class action shall not be dis-
missed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the pro-
posed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such man-
ner as the court directs."
FED R. Civ. P. 23(e).
As examples of the kinds of actions the court may take, if at the commencement
of the suit the court determines that the representation is not adequate, it may; dismiss
the action (Turoff v. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir. 1976)); deny class certification
but allow the proceedings to continue solely for the benefit of or against the named
parties (Cox v. Hutcheson, 204 F. Supp. 442 (S.D. Ind. 1962)); issue an appropriate
order to establish subclasses (Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969)); limit the class to those persons who would be ade-
quately protected by the named parties (Long v. Robinson, 436 F.2d 1116, 1119 (4th
Cir. 1971)); or consider augmenting the representative group to insure adequate rep-
resentatives of the entire class (Gibbs v. Titelman, 369 F. Supp. 38 (RD. Pa. 1973), rev'd
on other grounds, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir. 1974)). See also 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note
31,1 1765 at 623-25.
An important consideration in Kramer was the court's belief that disqualification
of counsel did not deprive the class of counsel's familiarity with the case, since the issue
of liability was not so complex as to require new counsel an inordinate amount of time
to become sufficiently familiar with the case to proceed to trial. Thus the class did not
suffer and could be adequately represented udder Rule 23(a)(4) since a new, competent
attorney could be quickly familiarized with the case. 534 F.2d at 1092.
"u See text at notes 19-20 supra.
See text at note 113 ir!fra.
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actions are also present in derivative actions. 1 ° 1 Thus, the legal stan-
dards for determining adequacy of representation should be the
same. This comment will suggest that there are several important dis-
tinctions between class and derivative actions and these distinctions
may dictate a different standard for measuring adequacy of represen-
tation.
A. An Overview of Derivative Actions
Federal Rule 23.1 which defines the procedural context of de-
rivative actions, permits a shareholder to sue on behalf of a corpora-
tion to enforce a right that the corporation may have failed to
pursue.'" This right of action was created essentially to protect
shareholders from the "designing schemes and wiles of insiders who
are willing to betray their company's interests in order to enrich
themselves." 103 The plaintiffs cause of action then, is not based upon
a personal right that is being asserted, because the action is derivative
of the corporation's right. 1 U 4 Thus, any recovery in a derivative action
goes to the corporation and not to the individual plaintiff or
shareholders whom he may represent.'"
I"' See note 113 ityrra.
"2 FED. R. CR:. P. 23.1 is quoted at note 2 supra.
1 "' Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 371 (1966).
1 " It is derivative when the action is based upon a primary right of the corpora-
tion but which is asserted on its behalf by the stockholder because of the corporation's
failure, deliberate oi- otherwise, to act upon the primary right. As the Supreme Court
has noted:'
[T]he cause of action which such a plaintiff brings before the court is not
his own but the corporation's. [The corporation] is the real party in in-
terest and [the plaintiff] is allowed to act in protection of its interest
somewhat as a 'next friend' might do for an individual ... disabled from
protecting itself.
Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947). See W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRpoRATioNs § 5908 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter
cited as FLETCHER].
105 In Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957), the United States Supreme Court
stated:
The contrasting difference between a stockholder's suit for his corporation
and a suit by him against it, is crucial. In the former, he has no claim Of
his own;he merely has a personal controversy with his corporation regard-
ing the business wisdom or legal basis for the latter's assertion of a claim
against third parties. Whatever money or property is to be recovered
would go w the corporation, not a fraction of it to the stockholder. When
such a suit is entertained, the stockholder is in effect allowed to conscript
the corporation as a complainant on a claim that the corporation, in the
exercise of what it asserts to be its uncoerced discretion, is unwilling to in-
itiate. This is a wholly different situation from that which arises when the
corporation is charged with invasion of the stockholder's independent
right. Thus, for instance, if a corporation rearranges the relationship of
different classes of security holders to the detriment of one class, a stock-
holder in the disadvantaged class may proceed against the corporation as a
defendant to protect his own legal interest.
Id. at 99.
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Although the plaintiff' in a derivative action is asserting a corpo-
rate right and the representative in a class action is protecting the
class interest, there are similarities in the actions. For a class action to
be binding upon non participants the demands of Rule 23 must be
fulfilled. 108 Likewise, a judgment in a derivative action will not be
considered res judicata unless the procedural requirements of Rule
23.1 are met."'
The derivative action is also subject to some of the same abuses
as the class action. One of the concerns in class actions is the possibili-
ity of counsel settling the action to the detriment of the class if a
large fee is part of the bargain. 1 b 8 A similar problem in derivative ac-
tions is the type of suits which as noted by the Supreme Court
sometimes were brought not to redress real wrongs, but to
realize upon their nuisance value. These suits were bought
off by secret settlements in which any wrongs to the general
body of share owners were compounded by the suing
stockholder, who was mollified by payments from corporate
assets. These litigations were aptly characterized in profes-
sional slang as 'strike suits.' 108
Rule 23.1 is designed to protect against this abuse by requiring court
approval for any dismissal or compromise)" In addition, as with a
class action, the complex litigation of a derivative action can often re-
sult in large attorneys' fees, which could serve as incentive to solicitous
litigation)' One means of controlling this solicitation in class actions
is to deny class certification because of inadequate representation.
Federal Rule 23.1, in response to the problems of ensuring adequate
representation in derivative suits, states that "the derivative action may
not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does not fairly and
adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members
similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or
association. „112 If the "adequate representation” criteria to be followed
in derivative actions were the same as that in class actions because of
the similarities in the actions, then the principles that have developed
around Rule 23(a)(4) could be directly applied to derivative actions. In
the view of one commentator:
Thus, the new rule does not represent a change in sub-
stance; it simply makes explicit the point that adequate rep-
resentation is important in derivative, as well as in class, ac-
tions, which means that decisions on this subject under the
'"" See text at notes 24-26 supra.
'"? See Note, Res Judicata in the Derivative Action: Adequacy of Represe n tation and the
Inadequate Plaintiff, 71 NItcii. L. REA'. 1042 (1973).
19" See text at note 54 supra.
101 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949).
u" FE:o. R. Civ. P. 23.1 is quoted at note 2 supra.
" I Sec text at notes 51-53 supra.
" 2 FED. R. Civ, P. 23.1.
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former rule continue to be authoritative. ... Mt seems
clear that many of the factors that are considered when de-
termining the adequacy of representation in a class action
under Rule 23 also should apply in the context of deriva-
tive suits. 13
B. The Standard of Adequate Representation in Derivative Actions
Although there are similarities in class and derivative actions,
there may be distinctions between them that are sufficient for a dif-
ferent analysis of adequacy of representation under Rule 23(a)(4) and
Rule 23.1.
The first step in determining a standard of adequacy of rep-
resentation in a derivative action is an examination of the interests in-
volved. In a class action, the financial interests at stake include the re-
covery of a monetary judgment which the members of the class will
apportion among themselves. In the derivative action, the interest is
to enforce the right of the corporation. Any recovery will go to the
corporate treasury and not to the shareholders directly. Thus, in a
class action, those "similarly situated" are the real parties in interest.
In order to receive adequate representation, those parties need a rep-
resentative who will participate in a recovery with them. Conversely,
those "similarly situated" in a derivative action need an advocate for
the right of the corporation, which is the real party in interest.'"
1 " 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 31, § 1833 at 393. See 3B J. MooRE:, supra
note 19,1 23.1.16 at 23.1-59-60 (1976) ("Thus the degree of antagonism or conflict of
interest with other shareholders as will preclude fair and adequate representation is
measured by the same standards applicable to class actions."). In G.A. Enterprises, Inc.
v. Leisure Living Communities, Inc., 517 F.2d 24 (1st Cir. 1975), the court disallowed
the derivative action that had been commenced because the plaintiff had other complex
business dealings with the defendant, making him an inadequate representative. It said
that standards for Rule 23(a)(3)-(4) are essentially the same for derivative suits and
"cases interpreting Rule 23 may be effectively utilized in analyzing the requirements of
Rule 23.1." M. at 26 11.3. In Ash v. Brunswick Corp., 405 F. Stipp. 234 (D. Del. 1975)
the plaintiff was represented by an attorney with whom Ile was a partner at law. Based
upon the decision in In re Goldchip Funding Co., 61 F.R.B. 592 (M.D. Pa. 1974), the
court would not allow the plaintiff to maintain a class action, nor a derivative suit. The
court applied the same reasons used in disqualifying the plaintiff from the class action
as it did in disqualifying the derivative action. Cf. Hornreich v. Plant Indus., Inc., 535
F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1976), where the court used the same adequacy standard in
class and derivative actions.
"'Shulman v. Ritzenberg, 47 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1969) involved a derivative suit
that was brought by a member of a minority shareholder group whose adequacy was at-
tacked because he did not represent the views of the majority group. The court cer-
tified his right, saying "it seems clear that fair and adequate representation of those
similarly situated means something different in Rule 23.1 from fair and adequate protec-
tion of interests of the class in Rule 23." Id. at 211. The court felt the very essence of a
derivative suit was such that the majority stockholders could not annul the suit; other-
wise there would be no derivative actions. Id.
For an opinion on the meaning of the words "similarly situated" see 7A WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 31, § 1833 at '394-95 pointing out the seemingly contradictory
requirement of the plaintiff in a derivative action representing the corporation, i.e.
shareholders, while the objective of the litigation coincides with only a minority of the
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The distinction between representing a class and advocating the
interests of a corporation is reinforced by the wording of Rules
23(a)(4) and 23.1. Under Rule 23(a)(4) the class representative must
adequately "protect" the interests of the class, whereas a plaintiff in a
derivative action under 23.1 must adequately "represent" the
shareholders. This difference in function, as described by the lan-
guage, between the protection and representation for the interested
parties suggests a difference of responsibility between the roles. The
distinction is also implied from the language of Rule 23(a)(4) that a
class is protected by a represeniativen 5 in a class action and Rule 23.1
that the shareholders are represented by a plaintiff"' in a derivative
action. Other language. in the federal rules similarly suggests different
standards for measuring adequacy. Rule 23(a) imposes upon the rep-
resentative certain prerequisites that must be demonstrated before the
class action can be certified. One of these requirements is adequacy
of representation, which must be proved by the plaintiff. 17 Thus the
action may not proceed until this burden of proof is satisfied. By con-
trast, Rule 23.1 states in effect that the action may not be maintained
if it appears there is not. adequate representation. Unlike in the class
action, then, this language can and has been construed to place the
burden of disproving adequacy upon the defendant." 8 Thus the ac-
tion will proceed until inadequate representation is established. This
should have the effect of proceeding with the suit unless the defen-
dant carries the burden.
Taken in the aggregate these conceptual and statutory distinc-
tions demonstrate a difference in the degree of representation neces-
sary under Rules 23(a)(4) and 23.1. Since the consequences of the
litigation will affect the personal rights of the members in a class ac-
tion, under 23(a)(4) the representative and attorney must act in a
fiduciary capacity to the class in protecting its interests. Since the per-
sonal rights of individuals are not at stake in the derivative action,
under Rule 23.1 the plaintiff is held to a standard of providing
stockholders. The analysis finds that "similarly situated" members are the minority stock-
holders and that the adequacy criteria in Rule 23 should be applied in Rule 23.1 to
determine the adequacy of the plaintiff to represent these minority stockholders: "In
effect what is taking place is a narrowing of the class to include only minority stockhold-
ers followeil by an inquiry into the adequacy of plaintiff's representation of that
group." Id. at 395. Accepting this as a plausible explanation of the personsinvolved,
this comment suggests that the measure of their adequacy of representation is different
in class and derivative actions.
1 " FED. R. CR'. P. 23(a) is quoted at note 1 supra.
18 FED. R. Cm P. 23.1 is quoted at note 2 supra.
' See note 27 supra.
"" See Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 592-93 & n.15 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974), where the court said that although the district court
was empowered to dismiss a derivative action should it appear the plaintiff does not
adequately represent the shareholders in enforcing the rights of the corporation, a find-
ing in the alternative is not required before the derivative action may go forward. It felt
the burden was on the defendant to obtain a finding of inadequate representation and
no such finding was obtained below.
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proper legal advocacy for the rights of the corporation. At the very
least, because of the difference in the role there should be no automa-
tic transfer of standards between class and derivative actions.'" The
demands of the representative's role in class actions require courts to
restrict counsel from serving as representative or quasi-plaintiff, but
the difference between the representative's role in class actions and
plaintiff's role in derivative actions may dictate a standard which in-
cludes a more thorough review of the relationship between plaintiff
and counsel in derivative actions. If in this review the conflicts of in-
terest between the representative and counsel which were of concern
in class actions are as strong in the derivative action, then there may
be legitimate reasons for applying the same stringent standard to the
determination of adequacy of representation. The following analysis
will examine those conflicts found in class actions and discuss their
applicability in the counsel qua plaintiff and quasi-plaintiff situations
in derivative actions.
C. The Attorney as Plaintiff
In considering whether a different standard of adequacy of rep-
resentation applied in class actions should be applied in derivative ac-
tions when the counsel acts as plaintiff, one must determine if the dis-
tinctions between the actions are sufficient to overcome the concerns
that arise when counsel acts as plaintiff in representing the interests
of a class. This comment suggests that the following concerns out-
weigh the distinctions between the actions and that the same standard
of disallowing the actions should apply. First, many of the same finan-
cial conflict of interest and ethical considerations are present in class
and derivative actions when the counsel is the plaintiff. Since deriva-
tive actions can involve complex litigation as in a class action, the po-
tential attorneys' fees can be substantial. This potential may serve as
an incentive for an attorney to bring an action and may involve the
same type of champertous litigation condemned in the class actions."°
Second, the attorney as plaintiff is torn between the two roles when a
possible settlement arises. The attorney may be tempted to extend the
litigation and thereby increase fees at the expense of a reasonable re-
covery for the corporation."' Third, the attorney-plaintiff role con-
flict in derivative suits presents the same flagrant "appearance of im-
propriety" that was disfavored in the class actions. Thus, the same
considerations in the protection of appearances that were favored by
the Kramer court apply as strongly to the attorney-plaintiff in the de-
rivative suits. 122 Therefore, the attorney qua plaintiff situation should
"'Sweet v. Bermingham, 65 F.R.D. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See text at notes
124 - 130 infra.
120 See text at notes 51-53supra.
' 8i See text at note 54 supra.
122 See text at notes 72-95 supra.
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continue to be discouraged in derivative actions as it is in class
actions. 12 3
D. The Attorney as Quasi -Plaintiff
While the distinctions between class and derivative actions may
not be severe enough to warrant different standards of adequacy of
representation when the attorney acts as plaintiff in a derivative ac-
tion, they may be sharp enough to warrant different standards when
the attorney acts as quasi-plaintiff. The opinion in Sweet v.
Bermingham 124 exemplifies this reasoning, and provides extensive ar-
guments against the application of a Rule 23(a)(4) analysis to a quasi-
plaintiff situation in a derivative action.
In Sweet, a stockholder derivative action was brought by the wife
of a partner in the law firm which represented her in the litigation. 125
In ruling on a motion to dismiss alleging that the plaintiff was an in-
adequate representative, the district court found that due to the spe-
cial nature of a derivative action a more limited analysis must be
utilized in considering representation questions under Rule 23.1 than
under Rule 23(a)(4). 126 Concluding that the question of adequacy of
representation for shareholders must be viewed through a different
looking glass, it promulgated the rule that:
[W}hen a derivative plaintiff demonstrates to the court an
intent and desire to vigorously prosecute the underlying
corporate claim and when he has engaged competent coun-
' 23 See note 113 supra for cases applying the same standard of adequacy in class
and derivative actions. Much litigation over the attorney qua plaintiff in derivative ac-
tions has occurred when the attorney petitioned for fee recovery. Courts that have
taken a dim view of the attorney serving as plaintiff have voiced discouragement by not
permitting fee recovery, while others have reasoned that the corporation received a ben-
efit from the action and have allowed recovery. The court refused to compensate a
plaintiff for his Own legal services in Eisenberg v. Central Zone Property Corp., 1 App.
Div. 2d 353, 149 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1956), alp, 3 N.Y.2d 729, 163 N.Y.S.2d 968, cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 884 (1957). Fees were awarded to a plaintiff-attorney in Orujes v.
MacNider, 234 Iowa '208, 12 N.W.2d 284 (1943), where the court found that it was
capable. of estimating a reasonable fee when the action was well founded and prose-
cuted to a successful conclusion. This concept is faulty for using the same alter-the-fact
logic that was criticized in the class action cases. See text at note 60 supra. See Comment,
Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Derivative Suits: The Substantial Benefit Rule Reexamined, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 164, 182 (1972), where it is argued that if the plaintiff-attorney works on
a contingent fee basis, the attorney's desire to he recompensed for his time is the main
deterrent to the filing of unmeritorious actions, whether the suit is brought on behalf
of a client or itt the attorney's own name. See Dann v. Chrysler Corp., 42 Del. Ch. 508,
215 A.2d 709 (Ch. Ct. 1965), alp, 43 Del. Ch. 252, 223 A.2d 384 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
124 65 F.R.D. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
' 25 1d. at 552.
' 26 Id at 553. The court disagreed with the authors in 7A W RIGHT &
supra note 31, § 1833 at 393. See note 113 supra and accompanying text. In distinguish-
ing class action cases, the court notes that where a representative party also serves as
counsel, or co-counsel, for the purported class, a conflict or interest clearly arises. 65
F.R.D. at 555. This suggests that the court may not have been willing to extend its lim-
ited analysis or representation to allow the counsel or counsel's law partner to serve as
plaintiff.
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sel to assist in that endeavor then, absent either a conflict of
interest which goes to the forcefulness of the prosecution
or the existence of antagonism between the plaintiff and
other shareholders arising from differences of opinion con-
cerning the best method of vindicating the corporate claim,
the representation requirement of Rule 23.1 is met. 127
Based upon this rule, the court decided that the simple fact that the
plaintiff was the wife of an attorney in the firm representing her was
an insufficient ground to dismiss the action. 128 The Sweet court's hold-
ing thus creates a more liberal standard than that used in class ac-
tions. Specifically, the typical class action analysis requires the rep-
resentative to have interests compatible with, and not antagonistic to,
those whom he would represent. Although the requirement of lack of
conflict or antagonism of interests is the same in derivative actions,
the court in Sweet attached different weight to these words. In Sweet
the relationship was not condemned, first because the conflict was
found not to relate "to the forcefulness of the prosecution" and sec-
ond, because there was no evidence that antagonism arose from "dif-
ferences of opinion concerning the best method of vindicating the
corporate claim."'" This court's approach would definitely allow
more of the quasi-plaintiff derivative actions to be certified, and cor-
rectly takes into account that the nature of the claim is one of a cor-
porate surrogate whose advocacy capabilities rather than status or re-
lationship to the counsel should be the crucial factor.
Nevertheless, in these quasi-plaintiff cases, there are still both
the "appearance of impropriety" and the Canon 9 considerations that
were present in Kramer.'" Presumably if there were indications of
unethical conduct or champerty on the part of the attorney, then a
denial of certification might be proper; but perhaps the prohibition
should not be automatic as it usually is in the class actions. Admittedly
to a lay person the distinction between a derivative and class action
may not be evident, and thus an "appearance of impropriety" in one
is the same as an "appearance of impropriety" in the other. However,
this comment has suggested that the legal distinctions between the ac-
tions require a more limited standard for measuring the adequacy of
representation in certain situations. Thus, while procedural and con-
ceptual distinctions are not sufficient to overcome the concerns of the
counsel qua plaintiff, they are enough to at least mandate a more
thorough review of the quasi-plaintiff situation in derivative actions.
127 65 F.R.D. at 554.
" 5 Id. at 556-57.
''" Id. at 557. The court does mention that it could oversee the case by reviewing
any settlement. Id. at 557. However, this should be used as a secondary consideration
once the adequacy of representation standard is met. The reviewing of fees should not
be used as a substitute for adequacy of representation itself. This consideration is the
same in class actions. See text at notes 56.60 supra.
' 3 " See text at notes 72.95 supra.
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CONCLUSION
Courts have overwhelmingly rejected certifying a class action
when the counsel seeks to serve as class representative. When counsel
has a family or professional relationship with the representative, i.e. is
a quasi-plaintiff, certification of a class action has generally been de-
nied because of a failure to satisfy Rule 23(a)(4). The dismissals are
usually based upon a real or potential conflict of interest regarding
the discrepancy between the amount of individual recovery and attor-
ney's fees for the quasi-plaintiff. Courts have also disfavored the prac-
tice because it offers an "appearance of impropriety" or other viola-
tions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Depending upon the
facts of the case, either approach may be appropriate in order to ef-
fectuate the purpose of Rule 23(a)(4) and to protect the interests of
the class.
In derivative actions under Rule 23.1 the attorney-plaintiff faces
the same judicial attitude as in class actions, although there is some
opinion in opposition. The judicial treatment of the quasi-plaintiff is
less clear in derivative actions than in class actions. However, the prac-
titioner should be aware that many of the decisions and commentators
have followed the class action criteria. This comment has suggested
that the criteria for determining the adequacy of representation in
certain quasi-plaintiff situations should not be as rigid as in class ac-
tions. This less rigid standard was demonstrated in the case of a plain-
tiff whose spouse's law firm was serving as counsel. In such a situa-
tion, there should be a more thorough scrutiny to determine if an ac-
tual, and not an apparent conflict of interest exists. The differences
between the role of the representative in the class action and the role
of the advocate in the derivative action dictate this distinction.
THOMAS J. URBELIS
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